Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? (1989)
By Colin McGinn
In Heil, pp. 781-97
I. Introduction
A. McGinn believes that we should admit that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, specifically, the problem of consciousness
B. but at the same time, he thinks this insolubility removes the philosophical problem
C. McGinn’s approach is “naturalistic but not constructive” (782)
1. previous attempts at a solution either:
a. invoke supernatural entities. Solution is “as extreme as the problem”
b. are “constructive:” that is, try to explain consciousness in terms of some natural property of the brain
2. McGinn, on the other hand, thinks
a. that there is a perfectly natural cause for consciousness
b. but that we are cut off from knowing what it is (782, q.v.)
II. To explain his position, he needs to explain his concept of Cognitive Closure
A. a type of mind is cognitively closed to some property P if its concept-forming procedures do not extend to P (782, q.v.)
B. different species have different sorts of minds, such that certain things are accessible to some kinds of minds but not to others (782-83)
1. the fact that a property is closed to some species does not make that property any less real: e.g., the invisible parts of the em spectrum are just as real as the visible parts (783)
2. the fact that some property P is “noumenal” for a kind of mind M does not show that P does not occur in some naturalistic scientific theory
a. (explain term)
b. property of being an electron closed to monkey minds
C. Consider, for example, that the British Empiricists Hume and Locke were right about the human mind
1. for an empiricist, such as Hume, all ideas are copies of impressions. Maybe animals have such minds.
2. from this point of view, a mind would be closed to unobservable entities (783)
a. thus the observable phenomena that are explained in terms of these unobservables could not be explained by such a mind (783-84)
b. however, that does not mean that such minds could not recognize that there is a problem there that needs to be solved, such as the problems our modern physics solves (784)
3. for instance, Locke thought that we’d never be able to explain the solidity of matter
a. but it does not follow for Locke that nature is somehow mysterious
b. rather, it feels like a mystery because of the limitations of the human mind
D. Now although we need not accept the empiricists’ theory of the mind, the mind “must conform to some principles”
1. these principles will not necessarily guarantee that we should be able to understand everything
2. but what is “noumenal” for us need not be miraculous in itself
3. that some problem seems insoluble may be due to some cognitive closure in our way of representing the world
E. that is what he will argue with regard to the problem of consciousness: (784)
1. it is cognitively closed to us
2. which makes it seem mysterious
3. once we realize why it seems mysterious, the philosophical problem disappears: there is nothing miraculous about it
III. McGinn’s argument
A. needs to establish three things:
1. there is some property of the brain that would naturalistically explain consciousness (784-85)
2. we are cognitively closed with respect to that property (785)
3. there is no philosophical – as opposed to scientific – mind-body problem
B. most of his work will go into defending 2
C. as for the first point,
1. he argues for it by eliminating alternatives:
a. rejects supernatural
b. rejects eliminativism about consciousness
c. finds it implausible simply to regard brain-mind correlations as brute facts
d. emergence sounds like a miracle
2. holds that brain states cause consciousness
a. analogy with life: we know that it evolved from non-living matter, so there must be some explanation of how this happened (785)
b. consciousness is a further biological development, so there must also be some explanation of it – whether or not humans are capable of finding it
3. so, there’s some property P in virtue of which the brain is conscious
D. as for the second point, it’s certainly possible that we could never grasp this property
1. there’s no guarantee that we can solve every problem we encounter
2. but what reason do we have for thinking that in fact our minds are closed with respect to P? (786)
a. the fact that we have failed to solve the problem so far is not a conclusive reason
b. however, this long-standing failure suggests to McGinn that we seek to explain this failure
E. to show that we are cognitively closed with respect to P, McGinn distinguishes two possible routes to P, and argues that we are closed with respect to each:
1. conscious introspection
2. the study of the brain
F. Considers conscious introspection first:
1. introspection reveals only the mind part of the mind-brain relation
a. neither the brain part
b. nor the relation between them
2. thus introspection is cognitively closed with respect to P (787)
G. another argument:
1. we cannot form concepts of conscious properties if we cannot have those properties
a. blind man cannot form concepts of visual experience
b. none of us can form concepts of bat experience
2. but suppose we had the solution to the general problem of how consciousness depends on neurophysiology
a. then we would understand how bat brains give rise to bat experience
b. but if we understood that, then we would know what bat experience is like
3. a dilemma: either we can or we can’t grasp the general theory (q.v.)
a. if we did, we’d know what bat experience is like
b. but we can’t, because we don’t know what bat experience is like,
4. we are limited by the specific sort of consciousness that we have, so we don’t have a general theory of how brains give rise to consciousness (787)
a. we cannot simply stipulate that our concept-forming abilities are unlimited (788)
b. we don’t have the ability to form concepts of all types of conscious states
c. this inability prevents us from having a general solution to the mind-body problem. Even if we could solve it for our own case, we couldn’t solve it for bats or Martians
H. Next he considers the approach to P through the study of the brain
1. he holds that our perceptual abilities constrain the sorts of concepts we could apply to the study of the brain (q.v.)
a. we do not perceive consciousness when we look at the brain
b. the question is whether we can perceive P, the property responsible for consciousness (789)
2. McGinn will argue that P is indeed closed to perception and also to inference
I. that P is closed to perception
1. nothing we can imagine perceiving in the brain would ever convince us that we’ve found the answer we seek – it’s like trying to conceive of property of a rock that would make it conscious (789)
2. this is because our senses are “geared to representing a spatial world” (q.v.)
a. we cannot link consciousness to the spatial properties of the brain
b. consciousness does not seem to be made up of processes that can be spatially represented
3. that is, Kant was right: the form of outer sensibility is spatial, and the cause of consciousness is noumenal
J. However, one might object, not all concepts come from perception. Consider the way in which unobservable entities and processes are introduced through the method of hypothesis in the natural sciences (790)
K. McGinn agrees with all this, but nevertheless does not think that this method will help us arrive at P, either
1. he argues that this method assumes what he calls a “principle of homogeneity,” according to which the concepts we introduce to explain the data are of the same “kind” as the data
a. that is, to explain physical data, we introduce physical concepts (790, q.v.)
b. but all we have regarding the brain is physical data. Nothing brings in consciousness (q.v.)
c. so inference to the best explanation will never lead us to introduce concepts of consciousness
2. this then leads him to the question whether we could arrive at P through the method of inference to the best explanation
a. one way in which we form theoretical concepts is by analogy with observable things
1.) e.g., we arrive at the concept of a molecule by starting with observable objects and conceiving smaller objects of the same general kind
2.) but things that are analogous to observable things can no more help to solve the mind-body problem than the original observable things themselves
b. but even a method of inference to the best explanation that was not constrained by the method of analogy would not give us what we want
1.) it would no more give us P than consciousness itself
2.) again, all the data we have are physical.
a.) Since we do not need consciousness to explain this data, we do not need the property that explains consciousness, either (790)
b.) indeed, this is why consciousness seems to be epiphenomenal to explaining physical events (791)
L. in sum, he does not think that P can be arrived at by an empirical study of the brain
1. nevertheless, the brain has this property, since it has consciousness
2. but only a “magical” notion of how we come by concepts could make us think that we could arrive at P through first perceiving the brain and then making an inference to the best explanation of what we perceive
M. to further explain his position, he contrasts it with a different account of why the mind-brain connection seems mysterious
1. on this account, even if we knew P, it would still seem mysterious, since one half of the equation is known by perception and the other by introspection
2. but McGinn doubts that it’s true that we can understand a connection only if the two things connected are supplied by the same faculty: what about touch and sight? (792)
3. McGinn says that a better explanation of what makes the problem seem so mysterious is that we are permanently blocked from a solution
N. to further explain his position, McGinn introduces a distinction between absolute and relative cognitive closure
1. absolute if no minds could resolve the problem, relative if only some minds can solve it and others cannot
2. whether the mind-body problem is absolutely or relatively closed depends on what we allow as a concept-forming mind
a. if we allow for minds that form concepts in ways other than from perception and introspection, then there may be minds that can solve the mind-body problem
b. but if we assume that all concepts are formed by perception and introspection, then the problem is absolutely insoluble
3. now our mathematical concepts don’t seem to be formed by perception and introspection
4. so, a mind that formed all of its concepts this way might be able to solve the mind-body problem (792)
5. hence, if the problem is only relatively insoluble, it would be solvable by a mind very different from ours (793)
6. whether the problem absolutely insoluble is an open question for McGinn
IV. McGinn’s optimism about removing the philosophical mind-body problem
A. although he’s pessimistic about a scientific or “constructive” solution to the mind-body problem, he’s optimistic about the philosophical problem
1. we do not need to solve the scientific puzzle to remove the philosophical one
2. there is a scientific explanation of the mind-body connection, but it’s in a science that is inaccessible to us
a. this science does not involve magic or miracles
b. rather, it lies in a part of the world that is “dark” or unknown for us
3. thus there is no metaphysical or conceptual problem regarding how the mind depends on the body
a. it only seems to us that there is something spooky going on when events in the brain cause sensations
b. this is because we are confusing our own cognitive limitations with spookiness in the things themselves (793)
c. but the things themselves pose no philosophical problem (794)
B. this is different from the problem of how the abstract world of numbers relate to the concrete world of knowking subjects, as in this case it seems that the spookiness is in the numbers themselves, whereas in the case of consciousness, it comes from our lack of knowledge
C. McGinn then argues that consciousness is actually a rather simple natural fact
1. our own sense of difficulty is not a very good guide to what is objectively complex
a. we are relatively good at understanding human behavior through folk psychology and even at coming up with theories of language (795)
b. but we have no idea how consciousness arises from the organization of matter
c. thus it seems we are better at understanding some of the more complex aspects of the mind than the simpler ones
2. but if we consider these things from an evolutionary point of view, McGinn says, language and folk psychology’s beliefs and desires are more complex and evolved later than consciousness. (795)
V. Implications of McGinn’s position
A. philosophers have had conflicting intuitions about the relationship between mind and body
1. some, like Descartes, think it must be contingent
2. but on the other hand, it seems ridiculous to completely disassociate the mind from the body (796)
B. the reason we have these conflicting intuitions is because of a lack of knowledge about what the connection actually is
1. the brain has physical properties that we know, and we know that variation in these properties correlate with variations in consciousness, but we don’t see the connection, so we think it’s contingent. We’re the dupes of our own ignorance
2. on the other hand, we are in no position to say that there is a necessary connection between the properties of the brain we know and conscious states
a. the relationship between property P and consciousness is not contingent
b. but we don’t know whether the connection between P and the other properties of the brain is necessary or contingent
C. so we don’t know whether disembodiment is possible, whether supervenience on the body is necessary, or whether spectrum inversion is possible (796)
D. We’re like a Humean mind trying to find out whether the link between the pressure and temperature of a gas at constant volume is necessary or contingent: to know that you need to know about molecules, which is closed to a Humean mind
VI. Conclusion
A. He concedes that his main thesis, even if it were true, is hard to believe
B. people do not like the idea that there is something out there we need to explain something but that we cannot understand – that is “noumenal” for us. It offends their idealism.
C. McGinn characterizes his own position as a kind of realism, in which the limits to what is real are not set by what the human mind can understand (797)
D. so the answer to the question of the title is both
1. “no” – scientifically insoluble
2. and “yes” – philosophically