Philosophy 342	Prof. Warren Schmaus
Philosophy of Mind	Office:  228 Siegel Hall
Room:  204 Siegel Hall	Mailbox:  218 Siegel Hall
TR 3:00 – 5:40	Email: schmaus@iit.edu
Office Hrs: TR 1:00 – 3:00	Phone:  x 7-3473
Web Site:  mypages.iit.edu/~schmaus/Philosophy_of_Mind

THIRD PAPER TOPIC:  Searle’s Chinese Room, Intentional Psychology, Eliminative Materialism, Connectionism, and qualia arguments.  This essay will be due Thursday, July 7, 2011.  It should be at least 500 words.   Be sure to consult my "Guide to Philosophy Paper Writing" on the web. 

CHOOSE ONE:

1.         Compare Searle with Boden on the question whether the kinds of computational processes studied in computer science can possibly bear any analogy to human thought processes.  At least part of your answer should deal with the question whether computation is purely a syntactic process, that is, the manipulation of abstract symbols in accordance with formal rules, or whether it is in some sense semantic as well.  Who would you side with in this dispute, and why?

2.         A philosopher who is a realist about mental states might object to Dennett’s philosophy on the grounds that it would seem to imply that whether you have a particular belief or desire depends on how somebody else is interpreting your behavior.  Dennett would argue on the other hand that a realist about beliefs and desires seems to be committed to the view that a person holds a potentially infinite number of beliefs in their mind.  Where do you stand on this question?  Do you think beliefs and desires are real things?  If so, in what sense?

3.         According to Churchland, is there any future role for folk psychology in the sciences?  Or does it belong only to the past?  What are his reasons for saying this?  Are these good reasons?  Does he propose a good replacement for it?  What do you think?  Is folk psychology here to stay or will it go the way of alchemy and astrology?  That is, is there a future for folk psychology among the sciences?  In ordinary life?  Explain.

4.         According to Baker, Churchland’s eliminative materialism is an untenable philosophy.  Why does she say this?  That is, in what ways does she think this philosophy undermines itself?  Do you think she is right?  Does Churchland have a good reply to this objection?  Does he call his own position into question by arguing that beliefs do not exist?  Is it a tenable philosophy?  Explain.

5.         Nagel and Jackson, each in their own way, argue that because of the problem of the subjective qualities of our conscious experiences, any sort of physicalist or materialist philosophy of mind is false or even meaningless.  Do you think that either of them offers a persuasive argument?  Are subjective qualities such as colors, sounds, or flavors an insuperable problem for materialists?  Explain.